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REDEFINING DEFENCE IN THE POST-
APARTHEID SECURITY IMAGINARY: THE 
POLITICS OF MEANING-FIXING
Joelien Pretorius1
1. INTRODUCTION
All societies are faced with questions of identity. These questions are not explicitly 
posed and the answers given to them are not necessarily only in language, but also 
constituted through society’s activities, its institutions and way of being. Stated 
differently, it is in their social doing that societies express their self-understanding 
in the form of embodied meaning.2 But, meanings are often contested and the fixing 
and reproduction of one set of meanings and not another are often political, i.e. they 
involve political struggle. From time to time a political struggle may seem to be 
won on such a grand scale that the process of re-fixing meanings and reconstructing 
realities based on new meanings, results in what is almost a traceable ripple effect 
through all aspects of society’s doing. 
Many analysts regard the end of apartheid as such a moment in South Africa’s 
history (see e.g. Vale 2004). With the onset of the negotiations to end apartheid, a 
rethink of societal identity ensued and agents came to the fore in an effort to fix new 
meanings. This article traces the politics of meaning-fixing with respect to the role 
of the defence force as apartheid declined from the mid-1980s, as it was negotiated 
from a current to a past organising principle of the “security imaginary” in the period 
1990 to 1994 and as the post-apartheid period commenced after the 1994 elections. 
The notion of a security imaginary is founded on the belief that security and 
insecurity (or threats) are constructed and not objective realities. Through fixing 
meanings to events and objects, and an identity to “the self” and others, relation ships 
are instituted. In the collective, often diverse imagination of a society, people think 
about what “threaten” them and how to respond to these threats. Features of the 
security imaginary are substantiated by political and social discourse, which draw on 
negotiated understandings of circumstances, capabilities and “others”. The security 
imaginary is thus not make-believe, and can indeed be gauged through journals, 
speeches, studies, conversations, reports, news broadcasts, and all kinds of accounts 
that draw from and reproduce a society’s understanding of security (Pretorius 2008: 
99-118). 
1 Department of Political Studies, University of the Western Cape. E-mail: jpretorius@uwc.ac.za
2 See e.g. Giddens' idea of structuration and segmental interests (Giddens 1984; Cassell 1993).
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2. DEFINING “DEFENCE IN A DEMOCRACY” 
Since 1990 the construction of the post-apartheid reality is an effort to establish 
discourses and codes of intelligibility that would reflect a new hegemonic order of 
social identities and power relations distinct from that of apartheid, and to express 
this new order institutionally. This was especially true of the attempt to reconstruct 
insecurity in a way that would mark a departure from apartheid. FW de Klerk already 
started this process when he came to power in 1989 by instituting rapid reforms. 
As a consequence of these reforms the South African Defence Force (SADF) lost 
influence over government and suffered severe budget cuts.3 
The political transition in South Africa was constituted as a move to power-
sharing (as opposed to power transfer) and therefore military transformation first 
and foremost meant the integration of the different armed forces that occupied 
the military landscape in 1990 into a new South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF). These forces included: 
the SADF;• 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National Congress • 
(ANC);
the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), the military wing of the Pan • 
Africanist Congress (PAC); 
the KwaZulu Self-Protection Forces (KZSPF), linked to the Inkatha Freedom • 
Party (IFP); and 
the Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBCV) defence forces. • 
The SADF did not boast a history of respect for human rights and adherence to 
international law. The Skweyiya Report also confirmed human rights abuses and 
torture of suspected infiltrators and apartheid agents in MK training camps.4 Military 
transformation thus needed to go beyond reconciliation to include align ment with 
“defence in a democracy” (Nathan 1994:3). In defining what defence in a democracy 
meant, different discourses intersected, roughly polarised towards two defence 
models, namely a state defence model and a model of defence based on a widened 
notion of security. 
2.1 State defence/military security and world military cultural norms
The state defence model was based on what Farrell (2005) identifies as world military 
cultural norms. These norms, in as much as they originate in the Anglo-Saxon world 
3 See Batchelor and Willett (1998: chapter 4) for a comprehensive study of the rationalisation and 
restructuring of the SADF from 1989 to 1993.
4 See Minnaar, Liebenberg & Schutte (1994) for a discussion of human rights abuses by the SADF 
and see the Skweyiya Report (1992) for examples of torture and abuses of suspected infiltrated and 
apartheid agents in MK training camps.
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and diffuse through professional military networks and the global arms industry, can 
be viewed as cultural imperialist in nature. In the South African context, the model 
held that democracies have legitimate, standing, professional and technologically 
structured militaries. South Africa is an aspiring democracy and should therefore 
comply with these norms. Neither MK, nor the SADF, could on its own conform to 
these norms.5 The former was a liberation movement versed in guerrilla tactics and 
had no experience as a conventional force, while the latter lacked legitimacy as a 
result of its apartheid past. 
The following excerpt from a chapter written by the director of the Institute for 
Security Studies (then the Institute for Defence Policy), Jakkie Cilliers (1994: 386, 
392), illustrates the gist of the discourse that grounded this defence model:
“The African National Congress (ANC), the largest political grouping 
in the country and the party set to play the dominant role in any future 
government, has been at the sharp end of the SADF’s capabilities, both 
inside the country and beyond its borders. Yet the skills, expertise and 
professional military knowledge to run a reasonable modern military force 
are very much captive of the white leadership cadre of the present SADF - a 
fact that the ANC is painfully aware of. While the integration of MK cadres 
into the SADF will make some contribution towards the skills required 
within a future military, their primary contribution will be the provision of 
legitimacy - a political rather than a professional military contribution.”
This model is modernist. It relies on a Weberian definition of the state as a 
community that has successfully monopolised the legitimate use of physical force 
and/or the instruments of organised violence for internal and external objectives. A 
monopoly on organised violence by a professional military was especially supported 
out of concern that violence had become endemic to South African society. The 
sources of these concerns included the idea that the resistance cam paigns to 
apartheid had made South Africa ungovernable and resulted in a culture of violence; 
so called “Third Force” (covert security force) activities to instigate violence in 
KwaZulu-Natal; right-wing paramilitary activities; and the possibility of disgruntled 
elements from both the SADF and the struggle forces using their military skills in 
ill-disciplined ways (Seegers 1996:277; Cilliers 1994:385). 
The model also draws on a Clausewitzean reading of what constitute 
stable civil-military relations in a democracy. It regards the military as a rational 
instrument of state policy and therefore proposes civilian control (supremacy) over 
the military (Bassford 1994:n.p.). Similar to other state institutions the military is 
accountable to civilian power and the public and should therefore adhere to a certain 
5 To simplify the analysis in the rest of the article only MK and the SADF are concentrated on, the 
main negotiators of defence transformation. It is recognised that others, e.g. the Transkei Defence 
Force under General Bantu Holomisa, also participated in redefining the defence function during 
that period. 
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level of transparency imposed by law. In turn, civil authorities are not to misuse their 
control over the military or interfere in the everyday operational issues of the military and 
should provide mechanisms for senior level military officials to influence defence policy 
(Nathan 1994:61-64). Both MK/APLA and the SADF were in the past aligned to political 
parties and their experience of civil-military relations therefore did not correspond with 
the imagined norms of a professional military. Reconciliation would be better served 
and repetition of the past prevented if the military assumed an “a-political” status. In 
turn, politicians should not intervene in “the execution of the defence task, which is the 
responsibility of the military line of command” (Le Roux 2002:167).
World military cultural norms also define proper defence in technological terms, 
reflecting a conservative military culture of “eternal vigilance”. Even in the absence 
of any foreseeable external threat, uncertainty demands a certain minimum of military 
technological capability. Defining defence in these terms adheres to what Kaldor 
(1981:131) calls the world military order. Accepting advanced technology as a prerequisite 
for effective defence implies accepting “an ordering of international military relations, 
conferring political influence, merely through per ceptions about military power” (Ibid.). 
For South Africa to be taken seriously in international relations it will have to maintain 
a certain level of military techno logical capability. This reflects a view of the military 
as an arm of policy as suggested by certain readings of Clausewitz. As a status symbol, 
military techno logical prowess provides bargaining power in international relations. 
The emphasis on technology in this model also harks back to a view expressed 
by modernisation theorists that the military is a driver of modernisation in de veloping 
countries. Lucien Pye (1966) and Samuel Huntington (1968) note that colonial rulers 
in their efforts to establish modern institutions in the colonies had most success in the 
defence realm. Militaries became industrial type organisations, able to adapt to new 
technology and install “responsible nationalism” in its members. The soldier is seen 
as “the reformer”. The defence force could play the same role of being a retainer of 
key technologies in South Africa. This role would include transferring technology 
to the civilian sector, training soldiers in the use of sophisticated technologies and 
contributing in establishing and maintaining a technological culture in society. 
2.2 Human/Widened security
Civil society groups, such as the South African Council of Churches and the 
Ceasefire Campaign,6 contested the emphasis on state defence and engaged in a 
“butter versus guns” debate during the transition period. They espoused a human 
security discourse that was at the time being popularised by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), defining security as the well-being of people 
(Cawthra 1999:9). These actors wanted to introduce into South African security 
6 The Ceasefire Campaign evolved out of the anti-conscription movement.
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discourse an alternative paradigm to “security as military/defence” based on a post- 
Cold War peace dividend. It held that South Africa has just emerged from an era of 
military excesses, that the Cold War has ended and South Africa has no foreseeable 
military threat, that socio-economic issues are the main threats to the security of 
the majority of South Africans and that military expenditure should therefore be 
sacrificed for these social imperatives (Frankel 2000:151). 
The human security discourse was supported by academics and analysts, some 
of whom formed part of the Military Research Group. Drawn from MK Military 
intelligence and the anti-conscription movement, this group functioned as the ANC’s 
unofficial policy-making body on security and defence matters (Batchelor and Willett 
1998:59). They also contested the state-centric/military nature of security, but did so 
within the context of conceptions of Critical Security Studies developed in Copenhagen 
and Aberystwyth universities since the 1980s. They agreed on the widening of the 
security agenda to include socio-economic and environmental issues as proposed by 
scholars such as Barry Buzan (1991). They further argued, with Ken Booth (1994; 
see also Booth & Herring 1994) that human beings should be the ultimate referents 
of security, although this did not necessarily preclude state security completely (rather 
“fewer guns, more butter”, in stead of “no guns, only butter”). 
The ANC’s views, through the Military Research Group, were infused by these 
discourses as illustrated by the following excerpts that also serve to give the gist of 
the human/widened security model:7 
 “National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the 
social, political, economic and cultural rights and needs of the South 
African people.”8
“The ANC believes that national and regional security should not be 
restricted to military, police and intelligence matters, but as having 
political, economic, social and environmental dimensions.
“Underdevelopment, poverty, lack of democratic participation and the 
abuse of human rights are regarded as grave threats to the security of 
people. Since they invariably give rise to conflict between individuals, 
communities and countries, they threaten the security of states as well.”9 
The widened/human security discourses did not provide one coherent defence 
model. The ideas proffered included radical changes, such as disbanding the de fence 
force and arms industry entirely or reducing the military to a gendarmerie force 
(Batchelor and Willett 1998:3). This can be seen as both an attempt to rid regional 
relations of the instruments and attitudes on which South Africa’s past destabilising, 
7 See also Vreÿ (2004:97) for a discussion of how these discourses came to influence ANC views.
8 The first "democratic principle of defence" proposed by Laurie Nathan in his book Changing of the 
Guard that was written as a reference guide on defence matters in 1994. Nathan went on to draft 
the South African White Paper on Defence (1996).
9 From the ANC policy framework Ready to Govern (1992).
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coercive and undemocratic regional policies were founded, as well as reaping a 
perceived post-apartheid peace dividend. The reduced threat environment for both 
South Africa and the rest of the region, it was argued, should manifest in a redirection 
of military expenditure to civilian programmes. 
This notion draws on a purported link between demilitarisation, disarmament 
and development that had particular resonance in Third World contexts. It holds 
that the experience of militarism in Third World countries and especially in Africa 
had generally not been a driving force of modernisation. Military governments had 
shown to be no less corrupt or less prone to atrocities than civilian governments 
(Nordlinger 1977; Finer 1991). And, military-related development, if any, led to a 
particular type of industrialisation that is capital, import, skills and energy-intensive 
(Kaldor 1981:160). The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in making loans to 
developing countries conditional on decreased military spending, based its policies 
on this link between demilitarisation and development (Van Aardt 1998:n.p.). 
Others in the widened security camp subsequently argued that this model is a 
reflection of Northern liberal economic views that stigmatised military security in 
developing countries. In the quest for widened security this amounted to “[throwing] 
the baby out with the bath water” (Van Aardt 1998:n.p.). Instead, a shift in the focus 
of the referents of security from the state to people does not mean that the military is 
not an important agent in the provision of (human) security in a developing country 
context. In fact, southern African military institutions often provide human security 
by default, because of the weakness or non-existence of civilian counterparts in 
government. 
In this light, Maxi Schoeman (then Van Aardt) (1998:n.p.) gives several reasons 
why widened security should not necessarily mean decreased military spending. 
Firstly, coastal defence in protection of maritime resources against poachers requires 
naval resources. South Africa could play a role in providing maritime resource 
protection for its neighbours. Secondly, military security pro vides knowledge, 
expertise and experience for contingencies such as disasters, which could be 
crucial to environmental and human security. Thirdly, decreased military spending 
would counteract the international ethos that has been championing peace support 
operations since the end of the Cold War. Fourthly, she links the increase in peace 
operations to an increase in intrastate conflict, con firming the logic of rethinking an 
internal role for defence forces in the maintenance of stability. 
This is also a view that Williams (1998:27) arrives at, but for different reasons. 
He notes that the military has always been used in internal roles and that there is 
nothing strange or inherently undemocratic about this use. In fact, he attributes any 
notion of an exclusively external role for the military in a democracy to a distortion 
of the duality of the military’s historic role. Whereas Schoeman argues against a 
hypocritical liberal pacifism that is suggested by the conditionality of decreased 
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military spending flowing from the Washington consensus, Williams argues against 
the reluctance of the military to play a role other than protecting state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity (an external role), based on a distorted view of what counts 
as world military cultural norms. 
The discourses grouped together in this section and labelled world military 
cultural norms and human/widened security respectively, articulated a range of 
meanings associated with defence and security in a democracy. They suggested the 
parameters within which the post-apartheid South African defence function might 
be re-imagined. 
3. NEGOTIATING A COMPROMISE: THE UPTAKE OF SUBJECT-
POSITIONS
The SADF espoused a world military cultural norms discourse and promoted a state 
defence model. Modernism had permeated the SADF’s thinking since its inception as 
the Union Defence Force in 1912. Modernist thinking in the SADF drew on military 
ties with Europe and North America, including the SADF’s participation in the World 
Wars and the Korean War as well as ideological links with the United Kingdom and 
the United States during the Cold War. In fact, one of the main organising themes of 
the apartheid security imaginary was that South Africa had been an outpost of the 
West, looking to become part of a Western collective security alliance to which end 
it even courted NATO (Cawthra 1986). 
After FW de Klerk’s 2 February 1990 speech in which he signified a redefinition 
of the state based on legitimacy (and not apartheid), the SADF responded by 
stressing their professional nature, a-political stance and dependence on a citizen 
force. They thought that these attributes set them apart from MK, a revolutionary 
army that would be more prone to political intervention (lack professionalism) and 
not used to operating sophisticated equipment or planning and fighting conventional 
wars (Seegers 1996:271). It was in this frame of mind that the SADF approached 
the negotiations. 
A three-way split characterised the SADF even before De Klerk took over from 
PW Botha, consisting of a group of liberals concentrated in the Air Force, a larger 
group of managerial-technocrats mostly from the Army and a hardliner element 
from across the military, but linked to defence intelligence (Frankel 2000:ix). It was 
by and large the conservative managerial-technical group who forged an internal 
coalition of interests within the SADF and defined its position politically once the 
decision was taken to negotiate with the ANC. Meeting with MK in 1993 for formal 
discussions about the structuring of future defence, the SADF prepared a high-level 
team for each issue to be discussed. They presented arguments in a specialist and 
technical way. Seegers (1996:278) maintains that this was a negotiating tactic to 
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intimidate the MK negotiators by exploiting their technical weakness. In return, MK 
used trade union tactics framing their arguments and positions in non-military terms, 
such as equality, democracy, justice and rights.10
These tactics have much to tell about the uptake and enactment of subject 
positions of the world military cultural norms discourse during the negotiations. The 
discourse created subject positions that attributed to white leadership in the SADF the 
position of vanguard of effectiveness in terms of “skills knowledge and organization, 
that is, virtually every meaningful professional activity” (Cilliers 1994:393). MK, 
on the other hand, was the people’s army that fought the people’s war of liberation 
(ANC 1992). Frankel (2000:8) describes the attitudes of the two parties during the 
initial negotiations as follows: “Since one side had not defeated the other, the self-
satisfaction of the SADF, rooted in its superior numbers and technology, was more 
than matched by the arrogance of MK in the atmosphere of political victory.” 
However, a curious “compromise” was struck between the state defence model 
and widened security notions as manifested initially in the Interim Constitu tion (Act 
200 of 1993). It stated: “The National Defence Force shall be established in such a 
manner that it will provide a balanced, modern and technologically advanced military 
force” (world military cultural norms), “be primarily defensive in the exercise or 
performance of its powers and functions” (widened security), “for service in support 
of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment” (human 
security), and “all members of the National Defence Force shall be properly trained 
in order to comply with international standards of competency” (world military 
cultural norms). 
In the Defence White Paper (1996) entitled Defence in a democracy the 
compromise is even more awkward. It acknowledges that “the greatest threats to 
the South African people are socio-economic problems like poverty, unemployment, 
poor education, the lack of housing and the absence of adequate social services, as 
well as the high level of crime and violence”. It places security within the context 
of the Government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a socio-
economic policy framework to address poverty, inequality and human rights issues. 
On the other hand, the White Paper states that the primary task of the SANDF is to 
defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Africa. 
The introduction of the idea of primary and secondary tasks unmasked a 
polarisation of the discourses supporting the two models. This was an outflow of 
what Cawthra (1999:9) refers to as a conceptual conundrum for the widened securi ty 
model in the South African context. The widening of the security agenda (to human 
security) had the potential to securitise economic, social and environmental issues 
and militarise society. This was oddly reminiscent of Botha’s policy of Total Strategy 
10 This view is confirmed in Solly Mollo's Master's thesis (2000). Mollo was an ANC member of the 
Army subworkgroup during the negotiations.
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and therefore politically sensitive. Ironically, the pacifist lobby and the “purist 
military professionals” agreed on this point (Gutteridge 1997:18). The “solution” 
was to prioritise the external defence function: “The SANDF may be employed in a 
range of secondary roles as prescribed by law, but its primary and essential function 
is service in defence of South Africa, for protection of its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity” (South African White Paper on Defence 1996:6). As was the case in point 
from its inception in 1912 and perpetuated by Apartheid, the primary way for the 
defence force to “protect the people” was thus still to protect the state. Protection of 
the people as human security was relegated to a secondary role. 
With acquisition requests already tabled by the SANDF to replace and up grade 
aging equipment, the Defence Review (1998) dealt among other issues with defence 
posture, functions, force design and capabilities. The pre-eminence of a state defence 
model was engrained by the Review’s focus on the SANDF’s “primary function” 
when it came to force design. Deterrence, it was argued cannot be “turned on and 
off like a tap” and therefore a certain capability level would have to be maintained. 
As a result, of the four options put forward for a force design, the one chosen made 
provision for a core force that could meet a whole range of contingencies (except 
invasions by major powers). To meet this objective, it was argued that force levels 
should be kept at just over 100 000 personnel and a variety of conventional weaponry 
should be provided. 
This force design option acknowledged that the SANDF would for the fore-
seeable future have secondary roles, such as support of the South African Police, 
border control, maritime patrol and participation in peace-keeping operations. 
However, it was argued that secondary tasks have the potential of undermining the 
combat readiness of troops and would therefore only be executed with the “collateral 
utility” of preparing for the primary function (Williams 2002:213). For Williams 
(1998:24) the focus on the primary function epitomises a view of modern, interstate 
relations that defines threat as “a conventional external aggressor” and a bias towards 
traditional (interstate) defence contingencies. 
The compromise as reached in the Interim Constitution reflects the peculiar 
circumstances in which policy was made at the time. The “negotiated” nature of the 
South African transition and the notion that the SADF had to be appeased to ensure a 
peaceful transition allowed the SADF to “ring-fence” issues such as force design and 
threat analysis (Cawthra 1999:3).11 Rocky Williams (2004:15), himself a former MK 
officer and participant in the negotiations, describes how uneven the process was. 
MK’s ability to participate was inhibited “by a range of very practical and personal 
problems not least of which was the fact that most did not enjoy the benefits of a 
fixed income, very few possessed their own transport, material resources to support 
them in the preparation of position papers were virtually non-existent, and they 
11 See Mollo (2000).
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lacked, quite simply, the advantages of an organisational infrastructure to empower 
them in what was an immensely detailed, complex and, for some, alienating force 
planning process”.
It is thus tempting to see this compromise as a victory of the SADF’s views 
over the ANC’s and MK’s during the negotiation and that the “white leadership 
cadre” of the former SADF continued to exercise dominance over defence thinking 
in the post-apartheid security imaginary. This biased the writing of new meaning 
into the post-apartheid defence function towards the status quo: state defence along 
the lines of world military norms. 
The “white leadership cadre” for historical and cultural reasons takes its cue 
from the modern defence establishments of the Global North. Espousing world 
military cultural norms was a means of SADF self-preservation since SADF personnel 
were versed in these norms and therefore indispensable. The ANC and former MK 
leadership went along, because a balanced, modern and technologically advanced 
force represents a form of international recognition. International recognition was 
crucial to the ANC in its first years of government to gain the confidence of sceptics 
inside and outside the country (not least investors) about a new governing élite. 
There is merit in this account, not least to explain how continued organisational 
frames and routines of the SADF predispose the SANDF to advanced military 
technologies and concepts. However, to argue that SADF views dominated those 
of the ANC and MK members in the end would be an oversimplification of defence 
perception and practice. This interpretation neglects the role of agency and the “up-
take” and enactment of roles scripted, as well as the dialectic between old and new 
organising principles in the post-apartheid security imaginary. What started out as 
arguably a forced compromise between incommensurable defence models as a result 
of SADF obstinacy has in the meanwhile been turned into synthesised discourses in 
support of the ANC’s foreign policy objectives. The next section will explain a more 
nuanced version of what can be regarded as the new organising principles of the 
South African security imaginary. 
4. SYNTHESISING STATE DEFENCE AND WIDENED SECURITY: 
NEW AND OLD MYTHS 
One way to explain how the compromise between the state defence model and 
widened security discourses was forged is in terms of the making of new myths, 
firstly within and about the post-apartheid defence force and secondly about South 
Africa’s place and role in the world (manifesting in foreign policy). Trubshaw 
(2003:1) traces the earliest uses of the Greek origin of the word “myth” to describe 
“a powerful male giving orders or making boasts. Mythos are performed at length, in 
public, by a male in a position of authority”. In this usage myths are not associated 
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with untruths, symbolism or religion. Rather, it takes on the meaning of ideology, that 
which provides structure in the form of dichotomies (us/them; male/female; black/
white, etc.) to how societies think about the world. These structures are embedded in 
narratives or stories that evolve over time and reflect a society’s self-understanding 
(Castoriadis 1987:147). 
The process of myth-making in and about the SANDF since 1993 is structured 
around the following factors:12 
Newly found “brothers (and sisters) in arms”: The transition to democracy 
occurred within the boundaries of what Durheim (1997:31) calls “peace talk” – a 
productive discourse that characterised the period between 1990 and 1994. The 
content of peace in this discourse was defined as cooperation and unity and its 
antithesis was violence and poverty that either harked back to Afrikaner nationalism 
or to examples of civil conflict in post-colonial Africa, both associated with violence 
and despair. Individual South Africans were called upon (almost pressured) to 
commit to a peaceful solution to apartheid. The only other options were after all 
continued civil war and destabilisation. Reconciliation between SADF and MK 
occurred within the framework of “peace talk”. 
In the months preceding the April 1994 elections, planning for the integration 
of the different military forces and other defence matters occurred within the Joint 
Military Coordinating Council (JMCC), a subcommittee of the transitional executive 
authority. All major political factions were represented in the JMCC’s working 
groups, but the SANDF and MK members dominated the proceedings (Williams 
2004:14). The working groups had to reach and report a consensus view on the 
issues that were delegated to them. This process provided an opportunity for senior 
officers to develop a common military identity and in turn, a soldiers’ pact to be 
forged. Williams (1999b:56) asserts that the common identity was predicated on “the 
somewhat predictable militaristic premise of ‘We are soldiers and we understand 
each other. Leave politics to the politicians to sort out’. The common ingredients of 
this emerging culture consisted of a belief in the inherent pragmatism of the military 
profession; common loyalty to the values of soldiering; a benign disregard for the 
vagaries of party-politics; and a common belief that the armed forces were being 
underfunded by the state fiscus”. 
The reconciliation of soldiers and the development of a new corporate identity 
thus involved the creation of new myths. These myths included the common belief 
12 One of the "myths" that helped to shape the post-apartheid security imaginary, which is not 
discussed here, involves the meanings that were fixed to the South African arms industry. The arms 
industry was sketched as a reservoir of science and technology capacity and a valuable earner of 
foreign exchange for the country through arms exports. The military-industrial complex played a 
big role in construing the arms industry as indispensable in the making of a modern South Africa. 
The strategic acquisition package (arms deal) was designed to ensure the survival of the domestic 
arms industry through international partnerships (so called "defence industrial participation" 
requirements). For a more comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Pretorius (2006: 111-125).
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that soldiers of all camps were only obeying orders during the apartheid period; that 
there is a common military culture among soldiers irrespective of their ideological 
background; that the military is better at getting things done than civilians; that the 
behaviour of a few rogue elements brought dishonour to the military profession 
during apartheid, but that in general all the armed forces behaved honourably 
(Williams 1999:56). 
Instrumental in the making of new myths was the appointment of Joe Modise, 
the former Chief of MK as Minister of Defence, and Ronnie Kasrils as his deputy. 
In accord with Nelson Mandela, both of them argued that South Africa should be 
a respectable military power. This was the basis for the soldiers’ pact and for the 
survival and re-emergence of the defence industry (Wrigley 2003:n.p.). 
Whether ordinary troops accepted this pact is another matter. The former Chief 
of the Army, Gen. Gilbert Ramano, admitted that this was not the case when he said: 
“When I say ‘we’, who do I include? I am sure that most, if not all, of the generals in 
the Army understand the concept of integration and identify with it. It is patently clear 
that … this sentiment is not as universally accepted as the ranks descend” (Ramano 
1998:n.p.). The high rate of soldiers leaving the SANDF after 1994 and incidences 
of racism and violence, such as the Tempe shooting, suggest deep disillusionment 
with the integration and transformation process. In this incident a black soldier 
(formerly an APLA member) shot and killed eight white SANDF members at the 
Tempe military base before killing himself (SAPA 1999:n.p.). The Setai Commission 
that was established to investigate “transforma tional discontinuities” in the wake of 
this incident confirmed widespread disillusionment with the integration process as 
a result of continued racism, abuse of power, ill-discipline, delays in issuance of 
medals and other qualifications and the disappearance of salaries owed to soldiers 
(Engelbrecht 2000:n.p.). 
Organisational restructuring: General George Meiring retired as Chief of the 
Defence Force in 1998 following the publication of the discredited Meiring Report, 
which warned of an imminent coup from within the ANC. His resignation unravelled 
a conservative clique of former SADF members, which exercised sig nificant power 
in the post-1994 SANDF. A new generation of officers from both the SADF and 
MK who were transformational in outlook and sought to restructure and align the 
SANDF to government policy took over (Williams 1999b:54). Since then there has 
been a greater measure of internalisation of the widened/human security discourses 
by the SANDF’s leadership cadre. It is, for example, not uncommon to hear senior 
officers talk about concepts such as human security and post-modern militaries or to 
see army force design documents include references to human security.13 In fact, “a 
distinctive feature of the South African debate about new thinking on security is the 
13 Interview with Brig. Gen. JD Malan, Assistant Director of Force Preparation, SA Army, Pretoria, 
4 November 2003.
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number of new security concepts which are being tried and tested there while they 
remain at a high level of theoretical debate within the academic and policy circles of 
the North” (Batchelor and Willett 1998:20). 
Democratic civil-military relations: The SANDF has engaged in political 
work (“winning hearts and minds”) to create a new image for itself in the eyes 
of Parliament and the public. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence is a 
parlia mentary “fast track” committee that consists of members of both houses of 
Parliament and all major parties are represented. It is briefed by the SANDF on 
issues of defence policy. During the Defence Review process, the higher echelons 
of the SANDF experienced the new democratic civil-military procedures and had to 
converse with the JSCD over issues traditionally their own prerogative. The JSCD 
was unwilling to rubber stamp the SANDF’s choice of force design. The SANDF 
high commanders realised that they would have to win over Parliament and did 
so by inviting the JSCD members to units and bases in order to “create a better 
understanding of the military” (Le Roux 2002:162). 
A working relationship between Parliament and the SANDF seems to have 
been forged as a result. Since the Defence Review process, defence is not an issue 
that the major political parties have mobilised for electoral support. In fact, despite 
an outcry over the rising costs of the strategic acquisition packages in the media and 
the concern over the slow delivery of benefits promised in the off-set agreements 
that accompanied these acquisitions, opposition parties did not exploit the issue to 
gain votes in the last election (Esterhuyse 2004:1). 
The SANDF has also engaged in significant political work to create a public 
image of a transparent and open defence force. The 1998 Defence Review process, 
for example, included consultative conferences with stakeholders on a national and 
provincial level, the participation of NGO representatives in the Defence Review 
Work Group, as well as public hearings conducted by the JSCD (Le Roux 2002: 159). 
Opinion polls indicate that the SANDF has generally been successful in discarding 
the image of an “apartheid war machine” (Liebenberg et al. 1996; Washington Post/ 
Kaiser Family Trust/ Harvard University 2004). 
The African Renaissance: The synthesising of the discourses that underlined 
the state defence and widened security models has also occurred as a result of foreign 
policy myths. These myths feed off general domestic and international perceptions 
that post-apartheid South Africa is destined to play a leadership role in Africa. The 
ANC leadership has pursued a modernist African agenda since it came to power. 
The “African” part of the agenda is linked to a greater connection between the 
ANC government and the continent than pre-1994 governments. This is due to the 
shared experience of political oppression and liberation struggle and the subsequent 
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solidarity shown by African countries in the fight against white supremacy and 
support for the ANC.14 
The “modernist” nature of the agenda is more difficult to attribute and arguably 
provides a basis for South African exceptionalism. Williams (1998) proffers a 
historical-cultural explanation. Industrialisation, urbanisation and the emergence of 
a modern South African state in the early 20th century brought a substantial section 
of South African society into contact with modernity. It was in these circumstances 
that the ANC was founded. Jordan (quoted in Williams 1998:15) asserts: “The black 
leadership that grew within these circumstances accepted the modern world because 
they recognized its liberatory potential for opening up new vistas for themselves and 
their people. They were modernists.” The Freedom Charter and subsequent policy 
documents reflect modernist narratives of rationality, humanism and emancipation. 
Drawing on a quintessentially European analogy, former President Mbeki’s 
vision of an African Renaissance confirms this modernist agenda for Africa. In a 
speech at the United Nations University in 1998, Mbeki engaged in creating the 
myth of the African Renaissance. He employed the image of the royal court of 
Timbuktu in the sixteenth century where “doctors, judges, priests, and other learned 
men … [were] bountifully maintained at the king’s cost and charges” to exorcise the 
contemporary African image of “machete-wielding Hutu militiamen”. He further 
employed the image of an African slave carrying a ton of lead “producing in her 
and the rest a condition which, in itself, contests any assertion that she is capable of 
initiative, creativity, individuality, and entrepreneurship” – a subtle explanation of 
why Timbuktu-like Africa has given way to the current violent and impoverished 
state of the continent (Mbeki 1998). By doing so he presented the basis for African 
rebirth: liberating Africa from externally imposed or internally harboured bonds of 
subjugation whether that means unfair trade or authoritarian governments.15 The 
African Renaissance is then sold as an African driven project in search for peace and 
prosperity through African-wide cooperation to establish peace, economic growth 
and good governance. But, it is also a worldwide project that would see Africa as the 
principal development challenge on the conscience of the world, thus encouraging 
debt relief, favourable trade policies and development assistance. 
The role of South Africa in this project is based on its distinctiveness from the 
rest of the continent. It is perceived as wealthier, more stable, technologically more 
advanced and having greater leverage in relations with the developed world. South 
14 Acts of solidarity included permitting MK bases in Front Line States and political pressure in 
multilateral forums, such as the Organisation of African Unity. This is not to say that African 
governments severed all links with apartheid South Africa. For a discussion of ties between the 
apartheid regime and African governments, see Pfister (2005). 
15 Mbeki's narrative is not original. Nkrumah, Du Bois, Nyerere and even African spokespeople 
of the late 1800s, early 1900s, e.g. Pixley ka Isaka Seme, made the same points. Their narrative 
differed, however, in that they did not make these points in a modernist way. Ka Isaka Seme, for 
one, precisely argued against comparison with Europe. See e.g. Ramose (2000:50). 
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Africa would be the continent’s engine of social, political and economic renewal. It 
would also be the bridge (or gateway) between the developing world (and Africa in 
particular) and the West (Gumede 2005). Former President Mbeki was careful for 
South Africa not to be seen as the “big brother” in Africa, but to enrol other African 
leaders, such as Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo and Senegalese president, Abdoulaye 
Wade, in support of this project. 
The African Renaissance myth has to an extent fizzled out in mainstream 
discourse. However, its basic tenets, such as a partnership among African countries 
as well as between them and developed countries to address underdevelopment 
on the continent, have been institutionalised in the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Develop ment (Nepad). Nepad is the economic programme of the African Union and 
the brainchild of Mbeki. Nepad accepts globalisation as an economic given that 
Africa needs to contend with. Acknowledging that globalisation has not benefited 
Africa, Mbeki argues that the solution is not to wish it away, but to interact with it 
in such a manner as to bring about a fairer state of affairs for Africans: “What this 
calls for is our conscious and deliberate intervention in the process of globalisation, 
as Africans, to produce these results of ethics, equity, inclusion, human security, 
sustainability and development” (Mbeki 1999). 
The SANDF is seen as an important instrument to put Mbeki’s vision into 
practice. In African Renaissance discourse stability and security are inextricably 
linked to (and even preconditions for) development in Africa. Nepad emphasises 
that there can be no development unless there is peace and security (Shelton 2004:4). 
This view is put succinctly in a Clingendael Institute document on defence sector 
reform in Africa: “The poor are disproportionately affected by insecurity – both 
poor people and poor nations. The poor see insecurity as a central source of ill-
being and poor countries often lack the capacity to address security issues, thereby 
creating a poverty–insecurity trap” (Ball et al. 2003:9). This view is aligned with 
the view that the ANC already espoused in the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), which lists peace and security as principles of reconstruction 
and development. Peacekeeping and regional security arrangements are seen as two 
ways to reverse the poverty-insecurity trap. 
In terms of peacekeeping, the SANDF faced a steep learning curve as it sought 
to put policy into practice. The 1998 intervention in Lesotho, on invitation of the 
government to “prevent a military coup”, saw a number of troops from the South 
African and Botswana military killed. The operation was widely condemned by the 
media and analysts who saw this as a return to apartheid style SADF operations. 
Moreover, the military execution of the operation left much to be desired in 
terms of military intelligence, discipline, planning and efficiency. The experience 
tempered the eagerness with which politicians thought of peacekeeping and clearly 
illustrated the difference between peacekeeping and regional policing of other states’ 
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populations. The SANDF was quite reluctant to engage in similar operations and 
as recently as 2001 the Minister of Defence noted that South Africa would rather 
send technology in support of peacekeeping than troops (Joubert 2001:4). As South 
Africa under Mbeki played an increasingly important role in establishing the AU 
and Nepad, more troops have been deployed in support of UN and AU peacekeeping 
operations. 
Regional security arrangements include a mutual defence pact with other 
southern African countries, the SADC Organ on Peace, Security and Stability, and 
the Peace and Security Council of the AU, which makes provision for a Common 
African Defence and Security Policy and an African Standby Force. Whereas 
peacekeeping is aimed at improving existing conflict situations (stabilisation), these 
arrangements should be seen as a long-term response to the poverty-insecurity 
trap.16 Military arrangements are thus seen as pro-active in that they have the added 
purpose of reinforcing so-called “security sector reform” and in that sense also play 
a preventative role. African governments are not oblivious to the perceived troubled 
history of military coups and the impact of military expenditure on development 
in Africa. Although the concept “security sector reform” is Eurocentric in origin 
and employed by donor countries with the aim of rectifying perceived defects of 
security sectors in developing countries, the concept implies reforms that are 
not dissimilar to some ideas emanating from African leaders that support Nepad 
(Williams 2000:n.p.).17 Military arrangements would further the implementation of 
these ideas on a peer basis by developing common security and foreign policies 
within the framework of the AU’s Calabash for Security, Stability, Development 
and Cooperation (CSSDC) and several subregional security structures. It is argued 
that common objectives developed in these institutions might eventually impact on 
the organisation and structure of the security sectors in individual African countries 
(Schümer 2004).
5. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this article was to explore how South Africa’s post-apartheid understanding 
of security and defence was shaped. Through the notion of a security imaginary and 
the deconstruction of constitutive stories (or myths) it explains how the discourses 
of world military norms and widened security were synthesised within an African 
Renaissance context. The meanings that were fixed to “defence in a democracy” 
16  Interview with Maj. Gen. Len le Roux, Head of the Defence Sector Programme at the Institute for 
Security Studies, Pretoria, 15 October 2003.
17 These defects include unwillingness/inability to exercise civilian control over security sector 
actors or military expenditure and procurement, the use of repressive security measures for narrow 
political gain and defence strategy based on inflated/"unreal" threat estimates (UK Depart ment of 
International Development 1999:8).
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through this synthesis allowed policy makers to justify a pursuit of a modern military 
for quite different reasons than in the West. For some, such as Vale, the outcome 
of this process lacks imagination and represents a lost opportunity to the region 
to apply human security in ways that discard the ordering of the region (and the 
world for that matter) in terms of military power. Others, such as Vreÿ (2005:42) 
see it as a way to break out of a conceptual straightjacket that makes no distinction 
between military coercion and illegitimate military force. He notes that this changed 
security paradigm is “bound to ameliorate the biased and destructive slant of the 
military interventionist debate…” [and subsequently] to provide conceptual space 
to devise and introduce the constructive use of military coercion as alluded by the 
AU. Acknowledging the culturally different evolution path of the post-apartheid 
understanding of defence and its African context may, over time, inspire divergence 
from world military norms as defined by the North to the establishment of an 
alternative African (military) modernity.
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